This past week in my International Security class, we discussed the United States and international order, grand strategy, and the balance of power in the international arena. The idea of the balance of power is simple – the theory suggests that international security can only be achieved within an arena where no state has a significant military advantage over another. If one state were to become significantly stronger than another, that state will become aggressive and attack weaker neighboring states in an attempt to take control, which in turn can spill over into conflict.

Some historians and political scientists have argued that the practice of balancing power has led to conflict in the past, citing all of the wars that occurred in Europe between the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the Congress of Vienna in 1815, as well as World War I. Critics of the theory have argued that the balance of power principle does not go far enough in terms of recognizing themes of ideology and identity as being crucial for determining threat perception.

Below is an essay I wrote while I was at Oxford, discussing whether the balance of power theory allows for a more peaceful world, or whether it inevitably leads to conflict.

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Does the balance of power guarantee the independence of nations, or does the balance of power cause war? The answer to this question, according to Martin Wight, is both. There is a plethora of historical evidence to suggest states will always pursue self-preservation – this constant pursuit is essentially the idea of the balance of power.[1] In order to preserve themselves, states will often build up armies, colonize various indigenous lands across the world, both to obtain more resources and to show that their armies and governments were powerful enough to be imperialists, and create alliances to balance each other out. However, there is a bit of a self-fulfilling prophecy within the operation of the balance of power – as states build up, it leads to other states inherently become less secure, thus creating the risk of potential conflict. Therefore, it was the operation of the balance of power that led to the outbreak of the First World War.

It is first important to define what the balance of power really is. Our world is anarchic and lacks any sort of overarching central authority that has a legitimate use of force above states – so how does international relations remain stable? The anarchic system itself is inherently what causes wars because there is no authority that can prevent wars from occurring.[2] Robert Jervis explains that conflict is generated by the security dilemma, which means tensions between states are created through the ways that states try to guarantee their own security.[3] Armies and alliances, which are both tactics that individual states can build up to protect themselves, in turn make other states feel threatened and less secure.[4] Martin Wight explains, “….so long as the absence of international government means that powers are primarily preoccupied with their survival, so long will they seek to maintain some kind of balance between them.”[5]

The theory of the balance of power is exactly what keeps international politics still in check. Even if any given nation state gains enough power to menace other strong states, it would be self-defeating – since other states will naturally feel threatened by the sudden rise of a single overarching hegemon, a counter-balancing coalition will build up that will automatically restrain that state.[6] The balance of power theory argues that as long as states seek survival, any individual state can ally with other states in response to external threats, and are willing to resort to war if needed – thus, none will be able to dominate the international arena and then other forms of restraint and stability with come into play.[7] Stability and restraint primarily arise through states’ constant desire for survival and autonomy. This leads states to join together temporarily in order to stop a potential hegemon from rising, “even if they have severe conflicts with each other and even if many would like to be hegemons themselves.”[8]

However, with all of that being said, there is a bit of a self-fulfilling prophecy within the balance of power. According to Robert Jervis, “the balance of power has within it the seeds of its own destruction.”[9] Joseph Nye explains that the distribution of power among states in any given international system is a good predictor of states’ behaviors.[10] Geopolitics, according to Nye, teaches us how states behave, and this has historical accuracy tied to it – half of the military conflicts between 1816 and 1992 began between neighbors, because a states that feels threatened by its neighbor is likely to act in accords with the idea that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”[11] This is applicable to the start of the First World War.

The creation of Great Power alliances and alignments – and their subsequent transformation in the international arena – were a key spark in the 1914 outbreak of war. According to Antony Best, the “overly rigid alliances” created in the middle and end of the 19^th century prevented the “proper functioning” of the balance of power, and somewhat ensured that what normally would have been an isolated crisis in the Balkans ended up turning into an all-out war. [12]

According to Wight, whenever there are three or more great powers or blocs that are not tied by alliances, this is said to be a multiple balance. In this case, the balance between all the great powers resembles a sense of equilibrium, because there are multiple powers or blocs that are dividing up the power in the international arena. This accurately describes 18^th century Europe – in Western Europe and overseas on the Atlantic, there was a balance between Great Britain, France, and Spain. In Eastern Europe, there was a balance between Austria, Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and Turkey. Furthermore, there were subordinate alliances among Germany, Italy, and all of their respective states.[13]

Over the years, there were a series of ups and downs with the Empires, and the Vienna Settlement of 1814 was an attempt to restore that. Great Britain had unchallenged supremacy outside of Europe due to its high naval supremacy. Russia had Poland. Austria was dominant in Italy. Prussia was given to the Rhineland. Eventually, France was able to resume its great power status.[14] According to Wight, multiple balance only lasts as long as no conflict of interests arise to create any schism between the great powers. In the instance that this occurs, the powers divide.[15] The multiple balance, in turn, resolves itself into a simple balance, with Wight describing this power balance as a “see-saw” rather than a “merry-go-round.” In the era of a simple balance, there are heightened tensions, a race in armaments, and an “uneasy oscillations of the balance of power which are called crises.”[16]

The Franco-Russian alliance of 1894 was initially built only out of restraint, not aggression, and the “Dual Alliance” between Britain and France in 1904 was intended to stabilize the European status quo.[17]^,[18] However, the original stabilizing character of these alliances eroded by 1904-1905. Additionally, the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy was formed in 1882 and renewed in 1907. Britain settled its quarrels with France and Russia by concluding ententes, and Germany eventually grew increasingly more isolated. At this point, the Great Power politicians realized they could no longer afford to risk restraining allies in fears of undermining alliances, because at this point, the Great Powers began to look more towards violent solutions to security threats – thus, allies were becoming increasingly more necessary.[19] Alliances are a crucial factor in the balance of power, and are a tactic that is frequently used by states to ensure that there is a balance of power. It was the individual states within these alliances coming to blows with one another – working within the theory of the balance of power – that eventually led to the outbreak of the First World War.

The original and most basic meaning of the term “balance of power” refers to “an even distribution of power, a state of affairs in which no power is so preponderant that it can endanger the other.”[20] What is crucial here is the part where no power becomes so dominant that it endangers those states around that particular power. Another crucial point of the balance of power theory is the idea that states are always inherently self serving and are seeking protection for themselves. What is tied to this idea is the idea of national interests. Joseph Nye ties the idea of national interests into international relations theory. First, realists believe that states have little choice in defining their national interests due to the inherent nature of the international system – states have to define their interests in terms of the balance of power or else they will not survive. To put it simply – a state’s position within the international arena will determine its national interests and predicts it foreign policies.[21] Liberals and constructivists, on the other hand, will argue that national interests are defined by much more than the state’s position in the international arena. Nye expands on this, explaining that the definition of national interests depends primarily on the domestic society and culture of a given state.[22]

As stated above, states are always self-serving, for the sake of self-preservation and security. Beginning in the late 19^th century and going until the beginnings of World War I, European powers – including Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and Austria Hungary – began to build up military armaments in significant numbers. This was done out of a sense of security, because security is a national interest of each European power. Germany’s mass armament, in particular, caused mass panic across the European powers. Following the unification of Germany, the state was under the control of the Kaiser, the “supreme war lord.”[23] The Kaiser had a personal military staff which operated independently of the civil and naval staffs – thus, it was possible for military decisions to be taken without the knowledge of any of the other branches of government.[24] This ended up being a crisis itself, as there was no coordination between the German army and the navy. With the formation of the Franco-Russian alliance, the German army’s strategy and buildup was based on the need to fight a war on two separate fronts.[25] At the same time, the navy based their strategy around planning a war against Britain.[26] The Germans began building a series of naval fleets in an attempt to defeat the naval hegemony of the British Empire, which had gone mostly unchallenged.[27] The result of the lack of coordination between the two branches of the military and their own interests, as well as the further lack of coordination with the Kaiser, Germany found themselves encircled by their enemies by 1914.[28] The Anglo-German naval rivalry that emerged from Germany’s fleet buildup ended up being a major factor for Britain backing the French in Morocco and aligned Britain with Russia in Russia’s struggle with Austria-Hungary for control of southeast Europe.[29] Furthermore, the British regarded Germany’s naval buildup as a direct threat to their naval hegemony and their worldwide empire, and the result was that the British, too, began to increase the speed of their naval buildup.[30] In Germany’s acts of self-preservation and national interest, which is inherently a part of the balance of power, it, in turn, led to increasing discomfort and a decrease in security in the states surrounding Germany, thus leading to other states – most notably, Great Britain – into also building up in response. Thus, with the operation of the balance of power, came significant military tensions that eventually led to the outbreak of the First World War.

There is no viable alternative to the balance of power – a world without it is simply universal anarchy or universal dominion.[31] However, while the balance of power is certainly the most viable and the best outcome, it does not mean that the balance of power itself is not dangerous. In the case of World War I, the very cases of the states creating alliances – the British, the French, and eventually the Russians against Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy – as well as the military buildup of states such as Germany, both of which are aspects of the balance of power theory, inherently made the European arena even more insecure, despite the best attempts at keeping the continent as secure and with as little tension as possible.

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Works Cited

Best, Antony. International History of the Twentieth Century and Beyond. Abingdon: Routledge, 2008.

Jervis, Robert. “A Political Science Perspective on the Balance of Power and the Concert.” The American Historical Review 97, no. 3 (1992)

Joll, James, and Gordon Martel. The Origins of the First World War. 1992.

Nye, Joseph S. Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History. New York: Pearson Longman, 2009.

Wight, Martin. Power Politics. New York: Continuum, 1978.

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[1] Wight, Martin. Power Politics. New York: Continuum, 1978.

[2] Jervis, Robert. “A Political Science Perspective on the Balance of Power and the Concert.” The American Historical Review 97, no. 3 (1992)

[3] Ibid, 717

[4] Ibid, 717

[5] Wight, 184

[6] Jervis, 717

[7] Ibid, 717

[8] Ibid, 718

[9] Ibid, 720

[10] Nye, Joseph S. Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History. New York: Pearson Longman, 2009.

[11] Ibid, 34

[12] Best, Antony. International History of the Twentieth Century and Beyond. Abingdon: Routledge, 2008.

[13] Wight, 164

[14] Ibid, 170

[15] Ibid, 170

[16] Ibid, 170

[17] Best, 18

[18] Nye, 56

[19] Best, 18

[20] Wight, 173

[21] Nye, 50

[22] Ibid, 50-1

[23] Joll, James, and Gordon Martel. The Origins of the First World War. 1992.

[24] Ibid, 73

[25] Ibid, 73

[26] Ibid, 73

[27] Ibid, 73

[28] Ibid, 73

[29] Ibid, 73

[30] Ibid, 79

[31] Wight, 184