Yesterday in my Social Movements class, we were discussing the successful rise of the far-right, and how this rise did not come as a surprise to any of us. In recent years, the radical right has been extremely successful in regards to framing their movement and their agenda, to the point where they are starting to influence across the political spectrum. Below is an essay I wrote for my Political Sociology tutorial at Oxford that breaks down the circumstances behind the rise of the radical right, and the reasons why it has been so successful.
A few things to note:
- I wrote this essay just a few weeks after the election, so some things may not be 100% up to date.
- As you will probably notice, this essay is generalized in the sense that it is not specific to the United States. Rather, it explains the rise of the radical right globally. These theories can be applied in both the United States and western Europe.
Why have some extreme-right parties been more successful than others in recent years?
Over the past fifty years, political institutions across the world – from Europe to North America to Latin America – have undergone a fundamental shift in how internal politics are run. New political parties have emerged on the basis of particular issues, including immigration and regional autonomy.[1] According to Bonnie M. Meguid, these “niche” parties have threatened the electoral and governmental dominance of mainstream parties.[2] The growing electoral support of these groups has led to these groups gaining significant influence of the shape and nature of government coalitions, key policy decisions, and the electoral strategies of mainstream parties.[3] These third parties have made too many gains in too many countries to still be considered a simple passing phase or temporary phenomena that will eventually fade.[4]
Over the past several decades, new political parties have begun to flood political arenas in countries across the world. Meguid refers to these parties as niche parties, which differ from stereotypical parties in three distinct ways. Firstly, niche parties reject the traditional class-based orientation of politics.[5] Instead of prioritizing economics, niche parties politicize issues that they believe have been ignored or placed outside of the dimensions of traditional party competition.[6] For example, the Green Party first emerged in the 1970s to call attention to environmental protection and nuclear disarmament. Radical right parties emerged in the 1980s and 1990s demanding the protection of patriarchal family values and a somewhat nationalist, immigrant-free society.[7] Secondly, the issues raised by these parties often do not coincide with existing lines of political division.[8] Thirdly, niche parties often limit their issue appeals. Voters often perceive niche parties as single-issue parties – thus, they do not benefit from pre-existing partisan allegiances, which means that they have to rely on the salience and attractiveness of their single policy stance for voters.[9]
Since 1960, over 54% of green, radical right, and ethnoterritorial parties in Western Europe have held a seat in a national legislature.[10] Donald Trump was just elected President of the United States, attracting radical right-wing voters who were tired of the mainstream party system. Even in instances where niche parties have failed to attain seats, their electoral strength has subsequently gone on to influence the fortunes of others, such as the rise of the French radical right party, The Front National, being able to defeat the Socialist Party and the Gaullists in 1997 in France.[11] To give an overall picture – a study conducted regarding third party voting in Western Europe over time showed that in the early 1980s, third party support remained flat, with the radical right often being excluded from parliament due to failing to meet necessary vote thresholds.[12] A sudden surge gathered momentum in the mid-1980s onwards, until parties reached a slight plateau in the early 2000s. In summary – over those two decades, popular support for third parties almost tripled.[13] This leads to these third parties gaining significant advantages – after initial entries into local government or national parliaments, parties that have successfully been able to consistently consolidate support over successive elections are able to gradually gain status, resources, and legitimacy. This leads to these groups building grassroots party organizations, select better and/or more experienced candidates, and expand access to the media and to public campaign funding, all of which provides a springboard for even further advancement.[14] Access to legislative office then often provides resources such as access to public funding, political patronage, and media coverage between elections.[15]
What explains the rise of the radical right? An initial list includes ten distinct proposals:
- A post-industrial economy
- Dissolution of established identity / fragmentation of culture / multiculturalization
- Emergence and/or growing salience of sociocultural cleavages
- Widespread political discontent / disenchantment
- Convergence between established parties in political arenas
- Popular / widespread xenophobia / racism
- Economic crisis and/or unemployment
- Reaction against the emergence of New Left and/or Green parties/movements
- A proportional voting system
- Experience of a referendum that cuts across old party cleavages.[16]
However, these perspectives can be further categorized into three main schools. The first, and the most common approach, is the sociological approach, which emphasizes structural trends that alter popular demands within any given society, particularly those developments in regards to socioeconomics and political attitudes of the electorate, which in turn generate opportunities for new parties.[17] These accounts focus on long-term, “bottom up” conditions and secular trends in society as a whole – primarily the growth of a marginalized underclass in postindustrial economies, patterns of migration flows, and/or the expansion of long-term unemployment – which are all believed to have exacerbated public demand for these third parties who gear towards the “losers’ in affluent societies.[18] The radical right is strongest when there are five distinct conditions: a. new waves of immigration, asylum seekers, and refugees have raised public concerns about this issue; b. the electorate has become discontented with mainstream parties and there is widespread distrust of the political system; c. a breakdown in traditional class/religious cleavages that structure mainstream political affiliations and party loyalties; d. cultural backlash against the rise of postmaterial values; and/or e. cuts in the welfare state, growing levels of job insecurity, and rising unemployment generating newfound social risks and disadvantages.[19] These structural conditions are fairly persistent and enduring developments in society that constrain the behaviors of all actors within the political system.[20] The relationship between society as a whole and the parties involved involves some level of endogeneity – in the long term, public policies can transform society, e.g. through welfare cuts or legal restrictions on the influx of immigrants, asylum seekers, or refugees.[21] Politicians who want to shape or alter public opinion by utilizing populist rhetoric of the fear of “outsiders” can raise the salience of the issue within the political agenda. It is difficult to find the reasons behind the popular explanations. Some accounts blame increasing job insecurity and rising unemployment rates, with the assumption that radical right support is strongest among the poor and less-educated populations who are threatened by rapid socioeconomic changes.[22] Other studies emphasize the rise of a new social cleavage, in cases where the “politics of resentment” are concentrated among an “underclass” of low skilled, low-qualified workers in inner-city areas.[23] The politics of resentment also ties into the idea that populist rhetoric taps into public disaffection and distrust of the political system.[24]
A second model is the supply-side factor model. This approach suggests that the demand-side analysis above is too simplistic, and instead chooses to emphasize what parties can do through their own personal agency.[25] Supply-side approaches focus on patterns of party competition, including their placement on the ideological spectrum, as well as the actions taken by the radical right and the interaction of both of these factors.[26] This approach focuses primarily on the anti-immigrant and economic policies in radical right manifestos, as well as the communication channels and rhetorical strategies these parties use, the characteristics and popularity of their leadership, and the financial resources and organization of these parties.[27] Studies suggest that the spatial location of mainstream parties on the ideological spectrum constrains opportunities for the expansion of the radical right.[28] In countries where the major parties on the left and right converge in a more moderate center, as well as in societies where mainstream parties fail to address issues of immigration and economics that concern the electorate, this is when the radical right has the greatest chance to maximize their support.[29] Other studies have found that when mainstream parties attempt to coopt the radical right’s signature issues, it actually ends up legitimizing the radical right.[30]
The third approach is the more traditional approach of focusing on institutional contexts, particularly emphasizing formal electoral rules that constrain both supply and demand within the marketplace.[31] This model analyzes the formal and informal rules that determine the nomination, campaign, and election process, which then in turn influences both party supply and public demand.[32] These rules also set up thresholds for exclusion (i.e. the minimum share of the vote required to secure a seat).[33] What is less well established are the informal / indirect effects concerning how the legal rules shape the norms, attitudes, and behaviors of parties and citizens, including the calculations that are made in anticipation of how the formal mechanisms work – these effects include strategic contests, strategic campaign communications, and strategic voting.[34]
Which parties are successful and which ones are not? According to Elizabeth Carter, the parties that embraced an “authoritarian xenophobic, a neoliberal xenophobic or a neoliberal populist type of party ideology” were more likely to find electoral success than parties that adopted either a neo-Nazi or a neo-fascist ideology.[35] The most successful forms of right-wing extremist ideology are ones in which culturism (new racism) is favored over classical racism, and in which fundamental values, procedures, and institutions of the constitutional state are not full on rejected.[36] By contrast, those parties that embrace classical racism and call for a wholesale replacement of the existing democratic order face significantly less electoral success.[37] This suggests that parties that adhere to classical racism put off electorates. Parties that distinguish between groups mainly on the grounds of race rather than culture, that stress the inequality of the races, and that embrace major anti-Semitic beliefs are “beyond the pale” for large sections of the electorate.[38] On the other hand, parties that believe that differences exist between different groups of people on the basis of culture instead of race, and that stress the incompatibilities of different cultures, seem to be much more inviting to electorates.[39] Parties that also fully reject the existing democratic order and its institutions are seen as being too “extreme” for most voters – instead, these voters would prefer significant reform on the established system.[40]
The findings further indicated that party organization and leadership are extremely key factors in explaining why certain parties of the extreme right find electoral success while others do not. This arguably is the most important variable in explaining electoral success of these extremist parties.[41] Right-wing extremist parties that are well organized and have strong leadership perform better at the polls (an average of 6.5 percent more of the vote) than badly organized and poorly led extremist parties.[42] The data suggests that electorates are more willing to support parties that exhibit cohesion and coherence, thus presenting themselves as credible actors. Badly organized parties cannot always compete in all constituencies, thus limiting their ability to achieve high electoral scores before even reaching the electorate.[43]
The ideological positions of these parties also have a significant effect on the right-wing extremist party vote.[44] The more right wing the party of the mainstream right, the lower the right-wing extremist vote has to be.[45] Similarly, the degree of ideological convergence between the parties of the mainstream left and right influences the right-wing extremist vote in a significant way.[46] As the mainstream parties become more ideologically similar, the right-wing extremist party vote subsequently increases.[47] Convergence between the mainstream parties is more likely to result in anti-party sentiment within the electorate.[48] This allows right-wing parties to have a greater ability to play the “anti-establishment card” and to claim that if voters want change, then they have to vote for an extreme right candidate because voting for a mainstream party would maintain the status quo since they resemble each other so significantly.[49]
In conclusion, extreme right parties fill a very specific niche role, and have found a way to permanently disrupt the political order in countries around the world. The election of Donald Trump in the United States is the perfect example as to why we cannot ignore third party voters anymore. Third parties have often tailored their party’s messages in order to appeal to the masses that are upset at the current government, promising “real” change instead of continuing the status quo of a two-party system. By appealing to the “losers” of society, third parties have been able to make massive headways into political arenas.
[1] Meguid, Bonnie M. “Competition Between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success.” APSR American Political Science Review 99, no. 03 (2005): 347-59.
[2] Ibid, 347
[3] Golder, M. “Explaining Variation In The Success Of Extreme Right Parties In Western Europe:.” Comparative Political Studies 36, no. 4 (2003): 432-66.
[4] Norris, Pippa. Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
[5] Meguid, 347
[6] Ibid, 347
[7] Ibid, 348
[8] Ibid, 348
[9] Ibid, 348
[10] Ibid, 347
[11] Ibid, 347
[12] Norris, 8
[13] Ibid, 8
[14] Ibid, 9
[15] Ibid, 9
[16] Rydgren, Jens. “WHY NOT IN SWEDEN? INTERPRETING RADICAL RIGHT POPULISM IN THE LIGHT OF A NEGATIVE CASE.” European Consortium for Political Research, 2001, 1-32.
[17] Norris, 10
[18] Ibid, 11
[19] Ibid, 11
[20] Ibid, 11
[21] Ibid, 11
[22] Ibid, 12
[23] Ibid, 12
[24] Ibid, 13
[25] Ibid, 13
[26] Ibid, 13
[27] Ibid, 15
[28] Ibid, 15
[29] Ibid, 15
[30] Ibid, 15
[31] Ibid, 11
[32] Ibid, 16
[33] Ibid, 16
[34] Ibid, 16
[35] Carter, Elisabeth L. The Extreme Right in Western Europe: Success or Failure? Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005.
[36] Ibid, 210
[37] Ibid, 210
[38] Ibid, 210
[39] Ibid, 210
[40] Ibid, 210
[41] Ibid, 210
[42] Ibid, 205-7
[43] Ibid, 210
[44] Ibid, 207
[45] Ibid, 207
[46] Ibid, 207
[47] Ibid, 207
[48] Ibid, 211
[49] Ibid, 211
Works Cited
Carter, Elisabeth L. The Extreme Right in Western Europe: Success or Failure? Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005.
Golder, M. “Explaining Variation In The Success Of Extreme Right Parties In Western Europe:.” Comparative Political Studies 36, no. 4 (2003): 432-66.
Meguid, Bonnie M. “Competition Between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success.” APSR American Political Science Review 99, no. 03 (2005): 347-59.
Norris, Pippa. Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Rydgren, Jens. “WHY NOT IN SWEDEN? INTERPRETING RADICAL RIGHT POPULISM IN THE LIGHT OF A NEGATIVE CASE.” European Consortium for Political Research, 2001, 1-32.
Perspectives 